A Reply to Professor Rowe by Dore, Clement
Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers 
Volume 3 Issue 3 Article 5 
7-1-1986 
A Reply to Professor Rowe 
Clement Dore 
Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy 
Recommended Citation 
Dore, Clement (1986) "A Reply to Professor Rowe," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of 
Christian Philosophers: Vol. 3 : Iss. 3 , Article 5. 
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol3/iss3/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative 
exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. 
A REPLY TO PROFESSOR ROWE 
Clement Dore 
In this paper I try to show that three of William L. Rowe's criticisms of my book, Theism, 
are much less than conclusive. 
(1) Rowe agrees that I have established, via my defense of Descartes's Meditation 
Five argument for God's existence, that God is not a non-existing being. He denies, 
however, that it follows that God is an existing being. In reply, I reject the thesis that 
something might be neither an existing nor a non-existing object. 
(2) Rowe maintains that the impossibility of God's non-existence might consist simply 
of its being the case that no one can destroy God-a kind of impossibility which is not 
strong enough to sustain my (S5) modal argument for God's existence. In reply, I argue 
that the impossibility of God's non-existence must be logical. 
(3) Rowe maintains that it may well be that religious experiencers have experienced 
God without experiencing him qua maximally great being, so that religious experiences 
do not provide us with a reason to believe that a maximally great being is logically 
possible. I argue in reply that if religious experiencers do not experience God qua supremely 
perfect, then they have no reason to believe that they experience God. 
I am grateful to William Rowe for his very generous review of my book. 
However, I want to reply to three of his criticisms. 
1) Rowe agrees that I have established, via my defense of Descartes's Fifth 
Meditation Argument, that God is not a non-existing object. But he argues as 
follows that "X is not a non-existing object" does not entail that X is an existing 
object. Let "magican" = Df "an existing magician." Then no non-existing object 
is a magican, since "A non-existing object is an existing magician" entails "A 
non-existing object is an existing object" and, hence, is logically inconsistent. 
However, there are no (real) magicians, so neither is it the case that magicans 
are existing objects. 
In my book, I argued that Rowe's position is incoherent, since an object which 
is neither an existing nor a non-existing object must be logically impossible, but 
since magicians are logically possible, so, too, are magicans. Rowe replies in 
his review that magicans are, indeed, logically possible but that, since all logically 
possible objects are either existing objects or non-existing objects, magicans are 
not logically possible objects and, hence, not objects of any sort. 
Rowe's contention that all logically possible objects are either existing objects 
or non-existing objects is presumably based on the sound intuition that no logically 
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possible object is neither existing nor non-existing (that all logically possible 
things either exist or they don't). But what are we to make of the claim that, 
though it is logically possible that magi cans exist and, though there are logically 
possible objects, magicans are not identical with any? Rowe states that there is 
"an air of paradox" here, but he appears to think that the concept of a magican 
shows that we shall simply have to put up with it. However, I think that Rowe 
has produced something worse than an air of paradox. If "X's being a logically 
possible object" is not an explication of~r at least correlated with-X's being 
logically possible, then, in the absence of a much more extensive account of 
what it is to be a logically possible object than Rowe gives us, the concept of 
a logically possible object is too obscure to be of philosophical use. 
What, then, has gone wrong? One answer to this question is that it is dubious 
that "A non-existing object is an existing magician" entails that a non-existing 
object is an existing object, when in fact it is not the case that magicians exist 
and a fortiori not the case that they are existing objects. Another answer is that 
"Magicans do not exist" should simply be taken to mean "Nothing is a magican, 
i.e., nothing is an existing magician." This locution does not even appear to be 
logically inconsistent, so long as we do not translate it into talk about non-existing 
objects. And non-existing objects are surely very dubious entities. As Plantinga 
has pointed out, "There exists an X such that X does not exist" look on its face 
to be necessarily false. But given that we dispense with non-existing objects, 
what Descartes's argument proves is the straightforward conclusion that it is 
false that God does not exist; and that indubitably entails that God does exist. 
Rowe might wish to raise the following objection here: "Descartes's Meditation 
Five argument contains as a premiss the claim that existence is a perfection 
relative to God. But this presupposes that existence is a property of things, i.e., 
that 'exists' is a descriptive predicate. However, if Dore is going to translate 'It 
is not the case that X exists into 'Nothing is an X' or (in case X is a proper 
name or definite description) 'Nothing is identical with X,' then he ought to 
translate 'It is true that X exists' into 'Something is an X' or (in case X is a 
proper name or definite description) 'Something is identical with X'. But then 
it becomes impossible to formulate adequately the claim that existence is a 
perfection, and, hence, a property, relative to God." 
But there are two ways of meeting this objection. Consider my formulation 
of Descartes's argument: 
(1) The concept of God is the concept of a supremely perfect being. 
(2) The concept of existence is the concept of a perfection relative to God. 
So 
(3) It is a conceptual truth that God exists. 
Hence 
(4) God really exists. 
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The first way of dealing with the envisaged objection is to substitute for premiss 
(2), "The concept of being identical with something is the concept of a perfection 
relative to God." And the second way is to substitute for premiss (2), "The 
concept of its being true that God exists is the concept of a perfection relative 
to God." Each new version supports the conclusion that it is a conceptual truth 
that God exists as strongly as does the original premiss. 
Indeed, I am now inclined to think that the latter substitution is the correct 
one. For, though I defended the thesis that "exist" is a descriptive predicate in 
my book, I now suspect that this is false. Suppose that "P" is a descriptive 
predicate. "P" is equivalent to "not not-P." But if "not-P" is not descriptive, 
then neither is its denial. Hence, if "P" is descriptive, then "not-P" is descriptive 
as well. It follows that if "exist" is a descriptive predicate, then so is "do not 
exists." But, e.g., "Centaurs do not exist" expresses a truth. And if "S is P" is 
a descriptive utterance and expresses a truth, then "P" is true of S. So, since 
"Centaurs do not exist" expresses a truth, "do not exist" is true of something, 
namely, centaurs, given that "exist" and, hence, "do not exist," are descriptive. 
It follows from the claim that "exist" is descriptive, then, that there are non-exis-
tent objects; and, once again this is a conclusion which it is best to avoid if that 
is possible. (It does not follow that there are no possible worlds in which there 
are objects which are distinct from any individuals in the actual world, only that 
in quantifying over those worlds, we do not quantify over those objects.) 
(2) In commenting on my modal argument, Rowe challenges my claim that 
there are only two kinds of impossibility, logical and physical, by introducing 
the concept of metaphysical impossibility-the impossibility which obtains just 
in case nothing has the power to bring about an individual's non-existence. Now 
the metaphysical impossibility of God's non-existence is not strong enough to 
sustain my (S5) modal argument. But it is demonstrable that the impossibility 
of God's non-existence is stronger than metaphysical. 
Suppose that God, an omnipotent being, exists but that there is a possible 
world in which God does not exist and (as in S5) every possible world is accessible 
from every other possible world. Then, since an omnipotent being can do every-
thing which it is logically possible that he does, God if he exists, can destroy 
himself, i.e., God's non-existence is not (even) metaphysically impossible. 
Here Rowe may say, "X's non-existence is metaphysically impossible just in 
case there is no being other than X who can destroy X." However, it can be 
shown that if God exists, then even he cannot destroy himself. And, in conjunction 
with God's omnipotence, this yields the conclusion that God's non-existence is 
logically impossible. 
Consider God's perfect goodness. If God exists, then it is either physically 
or metaphysically or logically impossible for God to do what is wrong. But since 
God is omnipotent and can work miracles, its being merely physically impossible 
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that he does what is wrong gives us no guarantee that he refrains from wrongdoing. 
Moreover, it's being true that no one else can bring it about that he does what 
is wrong (metaphysical impossibility) gives us no guarantee that he himself does 
not bring that about. But the concept of a maximally great being is such that if 
he exists, then we can, with absolute assurance, rely on him not to be a wrongdoer. 
Hence, if he exists, it is logically impossible that God does wrong. But God's 
destroying himself would be a gravely wrong thing for him to do. Hence, if God 
exists, then it is logically impossible that God destroys himself. But, once again, 
if God is omnipotent and there are possible worlds in which he does not exist, 
then it is logically possible that he destroys himself. So, if God exists, then 
because of his omnipotence and the logical necessity of his goodness, there is 
no possible world in which God does not exist, i.e., his non-existence is logically 
impossible. 
Very similar arguments will show that God's non-omnipotence and non-omnis-
cience are also logically (and not just metaphysically) impossible. 1 shall 
demonstrate this conclusion with respect to God's omnipotence and leave it to 
the reader to apply my argument to God's omniscience. The concept of God, a 
maximally great being, is such that if God exists, then there is at least one 
possible world in which he is omnipotent. Suppose, then, that there are possible 
worlds in which God exists but is not omnipotent. Then, given the accessibility 
of every possible world from every other possible world, it is possible for God 
to destroy his own omnipotence. But this would be a piece of grave wrongdoing 
on his part; and, as we have seen, if he exists, then it is logically impossible 
that God does what is wrong. So if God exists, and it is even possible that he 
is omnipotent, then it is logically impossible for him not to be omnipotent, i.e., 
God's non-omnipotence is not just metaphysically impossible. 
(3) Finally, Rowe criticizes my claim that, since "God" means "supremely 
perfect being," it is unlikely that everyone who has experienced God (in an 
ontologically neutral sense of "experience") has failed to experience him qua 
supremely perfect being. (I argue in my book that if people have experienced 
God qua supremely perfect, then it is logically possible that a supremely perfect 
being-whose logical possibility guarantees his actuality-exists). 
Rowe's criticism goes as follows: 
I might mean by "Purdue University," "The university founded by John 
Purdue." [But] although I've often experienced Purdue University, I 
don 'tthink I've experienced it qua University founded by John Purdue. 
My answer is that if "Purdue University" really does mean "The university 
founded by John Purdue," then though Rowe has experienced Purdue University 
without experiencing it qua University founded by John Purdue, he has not 
experienced it qua Purdue University. 
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Why, then, do I not agree that though people have experienced God, they 
may well not have experienced him qua supremely perfect being? The answer 
is that if they have not done the latter then, if "God" really does mean "supremely 
perfect being," God-experiencers would not be justified in believing (what they 
clearly are justified in believing) that it is God whom they experience, rather 
than some other being. In the case of Rowe's experiencing Purdue University, 
but not qua University founded by John Purdue, it is possible to justify the claim 
that what Rowe experiences is in fact the university founded by John Purdue. 
Formulating this justification might not be a simple task. It would ultimately 
involve historical research, either by Rowe or by people whom Rowe has reason 
to trust. But only a radical skeptic would believe that it is not in principle possible 
to give such a justification. However, things are otherwise with God-experiences. 
It would surely not be possible to do fruitful historical research regarding the 
connection between the non-defining properties which God-experiencers 
allegedly experience and the property of being a supremely perfect being. Nor 
does any other relevant kind of research appear to be available. So, once again, 
God-experiencers would have no ground for affim1ing that they have God-experi-
ences unless their experiences are of God qua supremely perfect being. 
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